Introduction
At no time in history has the notion
of the human person come under attack more than in the modern era. With the works of philosophers like
John Locke the notion of person has changed from its traditional understanding
to a corrupt understanding that pollutes the thinking of modern medical
professionals. The
clash between the traditional school and the modern school culminates in a
disagreement over the ideas surrounding substances. This paper intends to first
demonstrate the truth of substance especially how it relates to personhood and
then to point out the errors of the Lockean ideas regarding personhood.
Traditional View of Personhood
Both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas correctly took for
granted the fact of the existence of substances. Both St. Thomas and Aristotle
realize that the existence of substances is evident to the senses. When
one realizes through the use of their senses that change exists in our world it
becomes evident with minimal abstraction that substances exist. In
other words the concept of subject is necessarily implied in the visual reality
of change. For example we could not understand
the change in color of the leaves without a notion of substance and accidence. The case of the change in the color
of the leaves presupposes the existence of a substance, the leaves, and the
change of an accident, the color in the leaves. If a distinction were not made between substance and
accidence one would have to claim that the whole leaf changed as the color
changed. Any
botanist would tell you that the leaf, while it changes colors, does not itself
change rather it contains whatever chemical components make it a leaf. It would further be absurd to say
that the whole leaf changed as it turned from green to red. If the whole leaf
changed the red leaf would be coming from an unlike thing a green leaf. Leaving the discussion of evolution
aside something does not come from an unlike thing overnight; a pine leaf does
not grow from an oak tree. Clearly it is proper then to distinguish between a
substance and accidence.[1]
Substances are all things which have
separate existences.
“A substance is the perfection whereby a fully complete individual nature is
rendered in every way, in its being, and in its actions, distinct from and
incommunicable to any and every other being, so that it exists and acts sui
juris, autonomously, independently of every other being save the Creator.”[2] Substances
can be understood in two ways. Substances are the essence of the thing, the whatness of a
thing, the definition of the thing.
Substances are also the subject or
the “whoness” of a thing, what makes the thing an individual.[3]
A substance renders unity because
multiplicity is unintelligible unless it has a common body or unity. In the case of leaves unless there
was some substance, something that makes a leaf a leaf, it would not be proper
to look at a tree and claim it contains leaves. When pointing to the leaves on the tree I would have to say
that the tree contains a whole bunch of different things ( in reference to the
leaves). Substances
are the primary form because it is the cause in virtue of which a thing is
determinate. If
a thing does not contain its substance it is not the thing. For example if a leaf does not
contain the essentials of what it is to be a leaf it is not a leaf, it is
something else.[4] It
follows then that substances are the primary and fundamental beings of the
predicamental order.
Substances are first in three
respects.
Substances are first with respect to time because an accident cannot exist when
a substance does not exist, however a substance can exist without a particular
accident.
For example a leaf cannot exist without it whatever it is that makes it a leaf,
however a leaf that is red, an accident of a leaf can exist without being red,
it could be green.
Second they are first with respect to definition because in defining an
accident the definition of the subject must be present, however in the
definition of a subject the definition of its accidents are not needed. In the example of the leaf, when
defining a red leaf, I must define, first what a leaf is, before saying
anything about the characteristic of brown.
Thirdly they are first in respect to
the order of knowing because since that which is first in the order of knowing
is better known and each thing is better known when its particular substance is
known and not just one of its accidents.[5]
Substance is the primary kind of
being because substances are beings which exist in themselves. When a thing is defined it is
defined by its substance not by its accident.[6] For example when I define water I do not say that it looks
blue, rather I define it by what it is two hydrogen atoms connected by covalent
bonds to one oxygen atom.
There are many different divisions
of substance. Substances
can be divided into first and second substances, material and immaterial
substances, simple and composite substances, and spiritual and corporeal
substances.
Substance can be divided into first
and second substance. A
first substance is a concrete individual subject that is not present in a
subject. Examples
of first substance are Peter or Fido because when we say something of Fido we
are talking about a concrete individual, Fido the particular dog. Second substances designate
universal things that designate the essence of a subject. The second substance is not in the
subject but rather is predicated of the subject.
Examples of second substance are man
or fish because when we designate a fish we are not saying anything about the
essence of a specific fish, but rather fish in general.
Substances can further be divided
into material and immaterial substances.
Material substances are those
substances which are composed of matter and form. The matter is the physical material the substance is made
out of and the form is what orders it to a certain mode of being. The necessity of material substances
can be understood in light of the generation and corruption of things. Take for example the dog body. A dog body when it dies is still a
dog body but is not a dog.
The material, the matter still exists, however the form, his soul, no longer
exists.
Immaterial substances are pure forms for example angles. Pure forms cannot be numerically
multiplied since they have no matter. In the case of angles this means they each hold their own
rank. No
two angles are on the same hierarchical plane.
Substances are also divided into
simple and composite. A
simple substance is one which is constituted by a single substantial principle
that specifies the essence of the thing without any material present to
determine the thing. Angels
are examples of simple substances because they are pure forms and contain no matter. Composite substances are those
substances which are constituted by a natural and substantial union of two
distinct and incomplete substantial principles. These include all corporeal substances organic, vegetative,
sentient, or rational.
Examples of composite substances are worms, humans, and oak trees. A worm for example cannot exist if
just the matter of the worm is shaped to look like a worm. No the matter shaped like a worm and
the worm soul must be united for it to live. When the soul and body separate the worm does not exist, we
say it has died.[7]
Since composite substances are a
reality, substances can also be differentiated into complete and incomplete substances. Complete substances are composed of
two distinct principles which are substantially united to each other. A substance is fully complete only
if it possesses all of the substantial principles that allow it to exist and
perform all the actions proper to it as a member of a specific species. A human person is an example of a
complete substance because the human person is composed of two distinct
principles, the body and the soul which are substantially united allowing the
person to fully perform all that is essential of a human person. Incomplete substances are those
that are able to exist, yet not able to perform all of the functions of the
species without joining another substantial principle. The soul is an example of an
incomplete substance because it can exist apart from the body, for example
after death and before the resurrection of the body, yet it is not able to
perform all of the functions proper to the human person without its body or the
grace of God.[8]
All individuals belong to the genera
of substance because substances are individualized by themselves. Individuals that are members of the
genus substance are called supposites.[9] Supposites
are “any single substance which is of itself something complete, is not part of
another thing and cannot be regarded as a part.”[10] Since to subsist means to exist by
oneself and genera and species are only in something else, subsistence is the
same as hypostasis.[11]
Subsistence is not an existing
individual nature with regards to positive perfection because in nature there
are not individual substances, natures, or acts that are not distinct,
autonomous, independent, sui juris, and incommunicable in their modes of being
and acting. Subsistence
is a positive perfection that is really distinct from the complete and
individual nature making it a unifying principle. Subsistence is not then an absolute reality and thus a
distinction cannot be made between subsistence and a natural major real
distinction. Simply
it is a substantial mode that is naturally superadded to the substance but yet
modally distinct from the substance.[12]
The subject or the supposit takes
three terms depending on how it is used.
A subject that exists in itself and
not in another is called a substance. The substance of an individual person or thing which is
considered fundamentally principal of the person or thing is called its nature. Nature is thus substance considered
as an agent.[13]A subject
that underlies a common accident is called hypostasis.[14]
A further distinction lies in the
use of the term person. A
person is “an individual subsistence of a rational nature.”[15] A person is simply an intelligent
supposite. A
person is an intelligent supposite that is composed of matter, the material of
his body, and form, his soul.
Modern View of Personhood
John Locke presents a bad view of
personhood. He
argues that personality is that which is determined by consciousness rather
than body and soul. The
identity of man is that he consists in nothing other than a participation of a
continued life through a composition of particles of matter that are somehow
virtually united to form an organized body.[16]
For Locke a person is a “thinking intelligent being that has reason
and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in
different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is
inseparable from thinking and essential to it.”[17] A person
is simply a basic kind of thing. This understanding in no way hinges on if the
person is contained in a substance. Because for Locke man is a series of conscious states he
does not need a body. This
presents the possibility that a man can take on different bodies, what he
refers to as the transmigration of souls.[18] This
claim is crazy; as much as I may want to I cannot enter into Alex Rodriguez’s
body and go play baseball for the Yankees. Persons are supposites they are composed of matter and form. Only an unnatural event, death, can
separate the matter from the soul.
Essential to Locke’s definition of a
person is the notion of consciousness.
Consciousness is a perception of
what passes into Man’s own mind; it is a condition that is present anytime a
person is thinking. This
does not mean that when a person ceases to think, for example when he sleeps,
he is not a person because Locke believes that consciousness can be interrupted
and then returns not as a new consciousness but rather as one that is restored.
Application to Medical Ethics
Locke’s view of personhood creates a
separation or distinction between the human person and the human being. It is, however evident to the
senses that there is no distinction between a human being and a human person. The human person is not trapped
inside the human body in some manner similar to the Platonic belief that the soul
is trapped within the body. John Locke’s view fails to realize that without the human
organism the human person cannot exist.
The human organism is essential to
the human being and as such Locke’s idea that a person is simply a conscious
simple being holds no weight.
This philosophical battle is being
waged currently in our country in the field of bioethics. The clash of these two schools is
at the heart of the current debate concerning whether or not death should be
defined as whole or higher brain death.
Those who side with higher brain
death have subscribed to some form of the Lockean idea that the human substance
is not necessary while those who side with whole brain death realize the
essential nature of the human supposite. Having a clear understanding of substance and personhood it
becomes clear that a Lockean view of personhood is absurd.
[1]
Gardeil, H.D. Introduction to the
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: IV Metaphysicis. Paris: Les Editions du
Cerf, 1967. 153 – 164.
[2]
Coffey, Peter. Ontology or the Theory of being An
Introduction to General metaphysics. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1914. 265.
[3]
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 29, a. 2, in Summa
Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, vol. 4 trans. Fathers
of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981).
[6]
ibid.
[11]
Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia Dei,q.
9, a. 1. Literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers (The Newman Press, Maryland, 1981).
[16]
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. London: J.M.Dent, 1961. Book 2 Chapter 27.
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